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FEDERALISM'S "OLD DEAL":




P UR federal courts are currently undergoing "[t]his century's third
and final era of judicial activism."' The animating impulse of this
"contemporary activism is an interest in reviving the structural guarantees
of dual sovereignty," that is, in protecting the vitality of "states as entities
having residual sovereign rights."2 The judicially targeted threat to these
"residual sovereign rights" is the regulatory power of Congress. 3
This characterization of the modern era is not my own. It belongs to
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. It appears in his concurrence to an en banc Fourth
Circuit decision, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,
4
which invalidated the civil damages remedy for gender-based violence that
* © 1999. Peter M. Shane. All rights reserved. This Article was originally
delivered as the Harold Gill Reuschlein Distinguished Lecture on October 29,
1999 at the Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to audience
members at both the Villanova lecture and at a Washington University in St. Louis
School of Law faculty workshop based on this lecture for comments and
suggestions that sharpened my thinking. I benefited also from the research
assistance of Pittsburgh law student Trisha Williams '01.
** Harold Gill Reuschlein Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law (Fall, 1999), and Professor of Law and former dean,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 892 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
2. Id. at 893.
3. See id. (noting use of term "residual sovereign rights").
4. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding private cause of action
created by Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)), not within Congress' Com-
merce Clause power), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11
(1999). See id. at 892 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
(201)
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Congress enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). 5
Chief Judge Wilkinson's opinion is remarkable because he not only dis-
cerns candidly the current era of judicial activism-he embraces it.
"[T]he present jurisprudence," he writes, "holds the promise to be an en-
during and constructive one .... ,,6
Pragmatist that he is, ChiefJudge Wilkinson cautions that the poten-
tial of the current era will be lost unless the courts "temper" their role in
second-guessing federal legislation "by the maxims of prudence and re-
straint."'7 "If modern activism accelerates to a gallop," ChiefJudge Wilkin-
son warns, "then this era will go the way of its discredited forebear,"'8
namely, the widely deplored heyday of economic substantive due process
following Lochner v. New York.9 Chief Judge Wilkinson's cautionary notes
aside, it is worth beholding his opinion as among the very few ever written
in which the author actually welcomes the title, 'Judicial Activist."
Chief Judge Wilkinson's opinion has done American constitutional-
ism a favor. For a conservative judge to admit that judicial activism can
make an enduring and constructive contribution to our constitutional ju-
risprudence may significantly change the framework within which judicial
activism and restraint are usually debated. His perspective should pro-
mote a genuine and thorough reevaluation of that debate. And, on this
most general of levels, I endorse ChiefJudge Wilkinson's acknowledgment
that at least some versions of judicial activism can, in principle, be
constructive.
ChiefJudge Wilkinson is unjustified, however, in his optimism for the
current conservative project of devising new doctrinal tools for cutting
back Congress' commercial regulatory powers in order to protect the
states' sovereign rights. These doctrinal tools, I believe, are overwhelm-
ingly likely to prove unworkable. They are likely to be employed in the
invalidation of national legislation that, in terms of the values of federal-
ism, will be indistinguishable from other legislation that even current con-
servative judicial activists concede to be plainly constitutional. They are
not justified by the current circumstances of our federal system. And, be-
5. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)) (describing liability).
6. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
7. Id. at 897 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). ChiefJudge Wilkinson has written:
Legal reason represents the process of applying impersonal principles of
law to varying facts. Thus conceived, reason may chart the course be-
tween the subjective dangers of the pragmatic and the ideological. The
great danger of pragmatic judging is that it is divorced from underlying
legal principle; the danger of the ideologic, that it is severed from the
subtleties of real life facts.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 779,
792 (1989). His temperament perhaps reflects that of the late Justice Lewis Powell,
for whom he clerked.
8. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 898 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
9. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York maximum hours of employment
law), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
[Vol. 45: p. 201
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cause they are likely to be employed by judges less willing than Chief
Judge Wilkinson to acknowledge their activist role forthrightly, these doc-
trinal maneuvers will often be dressed up in discussions of history or pre-
cedent that will be wrongheaded and misleading. All of this is well
illustrated by the Fourth Circuit opinion to which Chief Judge Wilkinson
concurs, an opinion whose rhetoric is a kind of negative model of how
judges should not write important opinions.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW COMMERCE CLAUSE ACTIVISM:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Delineating the respective spheres of national and state regulatory au-
thority has been one of the Supreme Court's most enduring preoccupa-
tions. Two of Chief Justice John Marshall's three foundational opinions,
McCulloch v. Maryland'° and Gibbons v. Ogden,1 focused on just this prob-
lem. 12 To a significant degree, the Court's ensuing federalism jurispru-
dence can be regarded as the collective attempt of later generations to
wrestle with the very same issues that Marshall so famously confronted.
Between 1937 and 1964, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
that, in brief, came to embody an "800-pound gorilla" theory of Congress'
authority to legislate regarding "commerce . . . among the several
States."1 3 If asked what Congress might regulate pursuant to this most
important of its enumerated domestic powers, a competent lawyer or law
student by the mid-1960s could sensibly offer the answer, "anything it
wants."1 4 This development occurred, of course, during a period of gen-
erally expanding national regulatory authority at the expense of the states.
Judicial activism in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment during the
1950s and 1960s significantly displaced state and local decisionmaking on
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding creation of national bank).
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding national regulation of coastal
trade and navigation of waters).
12. The third leg of the triumvirate is, of course, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), which established much of the framework for the future of
separation of powers law with regard to judicial review of both Congress and the
Executive.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. This remained the conventional answer among law students for some
time to come. See Deborah Jones Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MicH. L. REv. 674, 674
(1995) ("When I graduated from law school in 1980, my classmates and I believed
that Congress could regulate any act-no matter how local-under the Commerce
Clause.").
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matters of criminal procedure, 15 civil rights, 16 public education, 17 election
design i8 and social welfare. 19
Hints of a different direction clearly emerged, however, with the as-
cension to the Court of then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist in
1972. justice Rehnquist was hardly the first modern Justice to show sensi-
tivity to federalism issues, either in interpreting constitutional restrictions
on state political authority or in evaluating the centralizing impact of na-
tional legislation. He revealed, however, an early penchant for crafting
ambitious judicial opinions that creatively limited the reach of federal law-
making with regard to the states. Perhaps most notable in his first two
terms were opinions narrowing the concept of state action reachable by
the Fourteenth Amendment,20 expanding the immunity of state officers
for liability under the Eleventh Amendment2 ' and limiting the implica-
tions of the Court's reapportionment decisions.
22
Justice Rehnquist's most important opinion of the mid-1970s in terms
of constraining the authority of the national government vis-a-vis the states
was, of course, National League of Cities v. Usery.23 In National League of
Cities, the Court, by invalidating the application of federal minimum
wage/maximum hour laws to state employees, turned its back on a chain
of precedent holding that state sovereignty per se was not a limitation on
otherwise permissible exercises of Congress' commerce powers. 24 Writing
for a five-justice majority, including a hesitant justice Blackmun, justice
15. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (limiting conditions
under which confessions would be deemed voluntary and admissible at criminal
trials under Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
16. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (imposing oral hearing
requirement under Due Process Clause as prerequisite to state's termination of
public assistance benefits).
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating state-
imposed systems of racially segregated public schooling).
18. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (imposing "one person,
one vote" requirement on districting for state elections).
19. See, e.g., Shapiro V. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (overturning state
length of residency requirements for public assistance applicants).
20. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding
that state-conferred liquor license did not implicate state sufficiently in race dis-
crimination by private club to render club state actor liable to suit under Four-
teenth Amendment).
21. See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that Elev-
enth Amendment bars retroactive monetary awards without state consent even in
suits against state officials brought under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), if
award can be satisfied only from general revenues of State).
22. See generally Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719 (1973) (holding "one person, one vote" requirement inapplicable to elec-
tion scheme for water storage district that permitted only landowners to vote and
in which votes were weighted according to size of landholding).
23. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (finding that Congress' attempt to mandate maxi-
mum hours and minimum wages for state workers infringes upon states' rights),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. See id. at 852.
[Vol. 45: p. 201
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Rehnquist announced that states could henceforth not be subjected even
to Commerce Clause legislation that would be valid if applied to private
parties, if such legislation: (1) purported to regulate the "States qua
States"; (2) would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions"; and (3) was not
justified by an exceptionally strong federal interest that overbalanced the
States' interest in autonomy.
25
Justice Rehnquist's opinion was elusive on the source of this princi-
ple; although he mentioned the Tenth Amendment, he hardly discussed
it.26 He seemed instead to rest on a background understanding of state
sovereignty from late Eighteenth Century political thought, a version of
state sovereignty that could not be impaired by federal legislation.27 Un-
fortunately for his thesis, the late Eighteenth Century political thought
most consistent with Rehnquist's view of state sovereignty belonged to the
Anti-Federalists, for whom the Constitution was a significant political de-
feat precisely because it did not embody their political philosophy. 28
Whatever its jurisprudential merits, National League of Cities ultimately
generated more law review commentary than immunity from federal regu-
lation. Four cases exploring the scope of National League of Cities reached
the Supreme Court between 1976 and 1982, and, in each of them, the
Court upheld Congress' regulatory powers.29 In 1985, Justice Blackmun
abandoned his allegiance to National League of Cities when he authored
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.30 That decision over-
turned National League of Cities on the ground that Justice Rehnquist's ar-
ticulated test had proved unworkable in practice, 3 1 inconsistent with a
proper understanding of federalism principles32 and superfluous in the
25. Id.
26. See id. at 842-43 (discussing limits on Congress' power over states stem-
ming from Tenth Amendment).
27. See id. at 843-44 (discussing constitutional division of power between states
and federal government).
28. See generally jeff Powell, The Complete Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Feder-
alism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982) (analyzing Rehnquist's views on federalism).
29. See generally EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding applica-
tion of federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to state employees);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding Public Utility Regulatory Poli-
cies Act of 1978); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678
(1982) (holding that application of Railway Labor Act to state-owned railroads did
not burden traditional state function); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 against Tenth Amendment challenge).
30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
31. See id. at 539-44 (discussing difficulties in defining protected government
functions under National League of Cities).
32. See id. at 545-47 (explaining how "problem is that neither the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to separate out important
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actual protection of state decision making authority.33 In a dissent that
could be read as a not-so-veiled reference to Justice Blackmun's advanced
age, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "I do not think it incumbent.., to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court."
34
By this time, however, the cause of federalism had picked up an im-
portant new ally on the Court. In 1981,Justice Stewart, himself a consider-
able defender of state autonomy, was succeeded by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. O'Connor brought to the job not only a strong interpretive
predisposition to respect the states' political authority, but also a sophisti-
cated intellectual perspective on the value and practice of federalism. Her
dissent in Garcia is more compelling than the Rehnquist opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities precisely because it at least hints at the creativity nec-
essarily entailed in the judicial task she advocates. 35 Unlike Justice
Rehnquist, she does not write exclusively as if the Constitution itself ex-
presses a doctrinal test of state immunity from regulation that the Court
can uncover archaeologically. She explicitly acknowledges that modern
economic conditions have created a world different from late Eighteenth
Century America, implying that the Court must construct ways of giving
enforceable content to the Tenth Amendment in order to protect any pos-
sibility for a meaningful diffusion of power between national and state
governments.
36
If ever there were an example of losing a judicial battle but winning
the war, or at least a larger battle, Garcia is it. Since Garcia, the Court has
launched into a three-pronged attack on congressional regulatory power
that goes well beyond the scope of National League of Cities and suggests at
least a potential return to what I would call the "Old Deal" with regard to
the Court's treatment of federalism.3 7 Under this Old Deal, the Court
33. See id. at 551-54 (discussing instances in which States have successfully
safeguarded their interests, gaining federal support and obtaining exemptions
from Congress' imposed obligations under Commerce Clause).
34. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., id. at 581-88 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
36. See id. at 581, 587-88 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (suggesting that "proper
resolution . . . lies in weighing state autonomy as a factor in the balance when
interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise its authority on the States
as States").
37. The Supreme Court's doctrinal efforts on behalf of federalism go beyond
its three-pronged attack on Congress' Commerce Clause authorities. For example,
in interpreting statutes that only arguably impose obligations on the states, the
Court has evolved a "plain statement" rule that requires Congress to "make its
intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the
States." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding that federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 does not prohibit imposition of
mandatory retirement age on state judges). Unlike the Court's doctrinal innova-
tions that would limit congressional authority, this doctrine reflects a careful bal-
ancing ofjudicial deference and concern for federalism. The Court, in essence, is
instructing Congress that state autonomy values are of sufficient importance that
the Court will not infer that they have been superseded absent evidence-in the
206 [Vol. 45: p. 201
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prior to 1937 had shown itself willing in the name of federalism to second-
guess the justifiability of national legislation and to impose categorical lim-
its on Congress' capacity to control interstate commerce.38 What made
the return to this Old Deal possible, of course, was not merely the intellec-
tual leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist and of Justice O'Connor; it was
also the appointment in 1992 of Clarence Thomas to succeed Justice
Thurgood Marshall. Unlike other appointments of the previous two de-
cades in which the old and new Justices tended to resemble one another
in their devotion to Tenth Amendment values,3 9 the appointment of Jus-
form of a plain statutory statement-that Congress has actually deliberated on the
relevant state interests and the reasons for superseding them.
The Court has also declined opportunities to read expansively Congress' au-
thority to use its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to control state ac-
tion that would not itself be deemed by the Court to be unconstitutional. See
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 629 (1999) (invalidating Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarifi-
cation Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (invalidating Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,
637 (2000) (declining to recognize Fourteenth Amendment as authorizing enact-
ment of Age Discrimination in Employment Act). I do not focus on these develop-
ments here for two reasons. First, despite the potential expansiveness of Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (sug-
gesting that § 4 of Voting Rights Act might be sustainable as independent determi-
nation by Congress that imposition of English literacy test on Spanish-literate
voters in New York was unconstitutional), the Court had already rejected the more
extravagant of his theories in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (rejecting
federal statutory reduction in state voting age from 21 to 18 on ground that Con-
gress lacked power to determine that state age qualifications constituted unconsti-
tutional discrimination against 18-to-21-year-olds). Second, in addition to policing
the federalism implications of interpreting § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
broadly, the Court-in delimiting Congress' powers-is also attending to the sepa-
ration of powers, namely, to the Court's own role in delineating the operational
scope and meaning of the constitutional rights that are the targets of Congress'
remediation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
38. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating
regulation of minimum wages and maximum hours for coal mining operations);
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating com-
pulsory retirement and pension plan requirements for all railroads subject to In-
terstate Commerce Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating
federal law that prohibited products of child labor from moving in interstate com-
merce), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
39. Successive appointments that tended to continue the likelihood that a
particular "seat" on the court would be deferential to Congress include the succes-
sion of Justice Fortas by Justice Blackmun in 1970 (at least in his post-National
League of Cities period), who in turn was succeeded by justice Breyer in 1994; the
succession of Justice Brennan by Justice Souter in 1990; and the succession ofJus-
tice White by Justice Ginsburg in 1993. I would also include the succession in 1975
of Justice Douglas by Justice Stevens, although Douglas, based on his dissent in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from judgment up-
holding extension of Fair Labor Standards Act to public schools and hospitals),
might well have joined the Rehnquist opinion in National League of Cities. Succes-
sive appointments that tended to continue the likelihood of pro-federalism sensi-
tivity included the succession of Justice Harlan by Justice Rehnquist in 1972; the
7
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tice Thomas replaced a reliable champion of congressional authority with
a Justice willing to rethink Commerce Clause doctrine all the way back to
Gibbons.
40
The first prong of this attack has been the erection of a categorical
"anti-commandeering principle" that precludes Congress from compelling
state legislatures or state executive functionaries from enforcing federal
law. In one case, the Court rebuffed Congress for its attempt to force
states either to regulate nuclear waste disposal consistent with federal stat-
utory requirements or to take ownership of all such waste within the state
itself.4 1 In another, the Court overturned legislation requiring local po-
lice to cooperate in determining whether proposed firearms sales would
be lawful until such time as the federal government could complete the
implementation of a computerized National Instant Check System to facil-
itate immediate determinations on the eligibility of would-be gun owners
to buy weapons.4
2
The second prong of the attack has been the breathtaking expansion
of the immunity from suit that states enjoy under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Under recent decisions, even if Congress may legitimately exert its
regulatory powers with regard to the states, litigants may not enforce in
either state or federal court the legal obligations thus imposed on the
states, unless a defendant state consents to suit.
4 3
succession ofJustice Stewart by Justice O'Connor in 1981, the replacement on the
Court of Chief Justice Burger by Justice Scalia, made possible by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's elevation in 1986, and the succession ofJustice Powell by Justice Ken-
nedy in 1988.
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (reevaluating Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
41. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
"take title" provisions of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985).
42. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating cer-
tain interim provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
43. See generally Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (be-
cause Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, states are immune to private suits to enforce provisions authorized only
by Commerce Clause); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (Eleventh Amend-
ment bars congressional exercise of Article I regulatory power from abrogating
states' sovereign immunity from suit in state court); College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) (abrogation of
state sovereign immunity by Trademark Remedy Clarification Act cannot be up-
held under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment because trademark infringement
is not deprivation of property; states do not waive immunity by participating volun-
tarily in federally regulated activity); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (Congress may not rely on its
enforcement powers under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from suit unless tailored as remedy for identified conduct
transgressing substantive prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment bars congressional ex-
ercise of Article I regulatory power from abrogating states' sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court).
[Vol. 45: p. 201
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Both these attacks on federal regulatory power are farther reaching
than National League of Cities. National League of Cities would limit Con-
gress' Commerce Clause authority only if its exercise would "displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions" and would do so without an overbalancing federal
interest.44 In contrast, under the anti-commandeering principle and re-
cent Eleventh Amendment cases, state autonomy is protected even where
the federal mandate has no bearing on traditional governmental func-
tions, and even when it would have no impact on the capacity of states to
structure or finance their integral operations.
It is the third prong, however, that harks back to the Old Deal of
federalism most emphatically. In United States v. Lopez, 45 the Court resur-
rected the notion that there is a discrete category of activity that, even if it
affects interstate commerce, may not be regulated pursuant to Congress'
commerce power unless a court independently determines that the effects
on commerce are substantial enough to justify national legislation. The
Court voided the originally enacted version of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act,46 which had made it a federal crime knowingly to possess a firearm
within 1,000 feet of a school.
47
The Lopez decision merits discussion, especially in light of its prog-
eny.48 But three preliminary points about the Supreme Court's new activ-
ism for states' rights bear noting in brief beforehand. First, the federalism
cases of the 1990s can hardly be defended as straightforward interpreta-
tions of the constitutional text. Second, like National League of Cities, they
are based on historical interpretation that is dubious at best. Third, their
public policy consequences-especially with regard to the Eleventh
Amendment cases-are truly regrettable.
Consider the textual point: the Eleventh Amendment expressly pro-
hibits only suits against states in federal court prosecuted "by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." 49 Were we to
rely on plain text, the obvious implication would be that states may be
sued in federal court by their own citizens and that the Constitution does
not guarantee sovereign immunity in state court at all. With regard to the
regulation of activities affecting commerce, Congress enjoys express au-
thority "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States," as well as
44. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
45. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
46. Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990). The indictment at issue in Lopez
rested on the original 1990 version of the Act. In 1994, Congress enacted the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796,
which both included congressional findings on the effects of firearm possession
near schools on interstate and foreign commerce and limited the reach of 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) to guns that have traveled in or affected commerce.
47. See id.
48. For a further discussion of the Lopez decision and its progeny as bad law
and misguided activism, see infra notes 63-116 and 117-98, respectively.
49. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
2000]
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authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution" the Commerce Clause power and all of Congress'
other regulatory capacities. 50 Nothing in the Constitution limits the
sweep of this language by articulating the test of National League of Cities,
the so-called anti-commandeering principle, or a distinction between Con-
gress' competence to regulate commercial versus non-commercial
activity.
5 1
With regard to history, as I have already mentioned, National League of
Cities suffers the conspicuous defect of interpreting the Constitution as if it
embodied chiefly the political intentions of its opponents. The anti-com-
mandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases suffer the equally apparent
problem of relying on historical analyses of inapposite issues. For exam-
ple, the anti-commandeering cases seek to establish an historical founda-
tion for the proposition that the national government was to have the
power to regulate American citizens directly, rather than through the
states. Proving this, however, is very different from establishing that Con-
gress was precluded from regulating American citizens indirectly and
through state governmental apparatus when it should choose to do so.
With regard to the "commandeering" of state administrative authority, the
evidence that does exist is chiefly in support of Congress' discretion to rely
on such authority when it deems it appropriate.
5 2
The Eleventh Amendment cases try to get around the obvious textual
difficulties by arguing that the amendment was not intended to embody
all of the state sovereign immunity from suit that the Framers recognized.
Rather, the Court has argued, there was a background understanding that
states would retain immunity from suit following the ratification of the
Constitution; the Eleventh Amendment merely made express the one as-
pect of that immunity that it was necessary to reiterate because the Mar-
shall Court had erroneously breached that immunity.
5 3
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 18.
51. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S.
CT. REv. 125, 129-30 (discussing potential scope of Commerce Clause power).
52. See generally Erik M. Jensen &Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15
CONST. COMMENTARY 355 (1998) (discussing Congress' power). The Court may be
on stronger ground in holding that Congress may not compel state legislative ac-
tion, although the complexities of this position are discussed further below.
53. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999). The Alden decision
stated that:
[T] he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is lim-
ited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitu-
tion's structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by
this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification
of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by
virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the
other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.
210 [Vol. 45: p. 201
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Even if there were something to this general point, it again would be
answering the wrong question. We can assume, that is, that the founding
generation expected that states would retain after ratification the sover-
eign immunity that they had enjoyed at common law. The actual issue
warranting exploration, however, is whether the founding generation
would have thought it unconstitutional to overcome that immunity
through federal legislation. 5 4 On that point, the available evidence again
suggests that the Court's reading of congressional authority is unjustifiably
narrow.
5 5
At least as troubling as these textual and historical points is that the
anti-commandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases create perverse pub-
lic policy outcomes. A direct implication of the anti-commandeering
cases, especially with regard to the bar against conscripting state adminis-
trative authority, is that Congress should consider enlarging our national
law enforcement apparatus whenever it expands the substantive reach of
our national regulatory law.5 6 This would seem, on its face, to increase the
threat to individual liberty stemming from national law enforcement ma-
chinery. It would also seem to multiply considerably the potential sources
of tension between state and national authorities engaged in law enforce-
ment. It is worth noting that other countries, such as Germany, which is
also a federal republic, protect the values of federalism precisely by insist-
ing that only state authorities be charged with the implementation of na-
tional law. 57 In the same vein, there may well be contexts in which
54. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Courts Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. Ri-v. 2213, 2244-
45 (1996) (discussing Congress' power to abrogate common law immunities).
55. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270-2289 (Souter, J., dissenting) (detailing his-
tory); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-42, 160-162, 161 n.55 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (exploring common law); see also Hovenkamp, supra note
54, at 2244-45 (criticizing interpretation of Constitution in Seminole Tribe)
56. The alternative would be to offer funding to the states in return for their
voluntary implementation of federal legislation. The breadth with which the
Supreme Court has approved such "bargains" casts some doubt on the practical
significance of the anti-commandeering and Eleventh Amendment cases. See, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding conditioning of fed-
eral highway funding on state decisions to raise minimum drinking age to 21).
Congress, for example, could condition federal funding for state police authorities
on their participation in identification checks for would-be gun purchasers, or
make federal funds for state universities dependent on waivers of sovereign immu-
nity in lawsuits charging patent violations by those universities.
57. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that some countries implement federal law through constituent
states). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion states:
The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union
...all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will
themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees en-
acted by the central "federal" body. They do so in part because they be-
lieve that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent
authority of the "state," member nation, or other subsidiary government,
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American states would prefer to shoulder some of the burdens of national
law enforcement if that responsibility also entailed the prospect of coordi-
nating federal law enforcement activity with state priorities and reducing
interagency friction.
The normative consequences of the Eleventh Amendment cases are
even more obviously troubling. One is hard pressed to identify any public
policy reason why we would prefer a constitutional regime in which the
national government is permitted to impose legal obligations on the
states, but in which the states are constitutionally entitled to violate those
obligations with relative impunity. The holding in Alden v. Maine58 de-
prives state employees who are unlawfully denied federally mandated over-
time pay the opportunity to seek a judicial remedy.59 Under Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,60 states
may, free from private challenge, violate the patent rights of private par-
ties even when such infringement is willful. 61 Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents62 insulates state universities from private suits based on unlawful age
discrimination. Far from advancing two of the values most often associ-
ated with federalism-protecting citizens from the over-concentration of
power and promoting the accountability of political authority-these deci-
sions denigrate them. Enlarging the prospects for oppressive state govern-
ment hardly seems a project worthy of judicial solicitude.
III. LoPEz AND ITS PROGENY AS BAD LAw
Of the three prongs of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf
of the states, the one that is potentially most radical is the crafting of judi-
cially imposed constraints on the commerce power itself, as embodied in
United States v. Lopez.6 3 Brzonkala, the case that elicited ChiefJudge Wilkin-
son's defense of federalism-based judicial activism, is an attempt to imple-
ment such constraints. 6 4 Lopez and Brzonkala most pressingly pose the
58. 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot "subject non-
consenting States to private suits for damages in state courts").
59. See id. at 2269 (dismissing case on basis of sovereign immunity).
60. 119 S. Ct. 2199.
61. See id. at 2209-11 (1999) (discussing State infringement on patent rights).
62. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
63. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
64. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 830
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (declaring portions of VAWA outside scope of Congress'
Commerce Clause power), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 11 (1999). The majority in Brzonkala also rejected the argument that the
VAWA could be upheld under Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 861-89. Although the argument in favor of congressional
power is not frivolous, there is plainly no body of well-established precedent estab-
lishing Congress' power to provide civil remedies against private individuals acting
independently of state authorities as a way of enforcing the states' obligation of
equal protection. Thus, the Brzonkala Fourteenth Amendment holding-despite
the aggressiveness of Judge Luttig's prose-ought not be viewed as involving the
same kind of activism as is embodied in the Commerce Clause holding. The
12
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question whether judicial activism in the name of state sovereignty is well
justified. But they also deserve to be analyzed with regard to their sound-
ness as plausible legal doctrine.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the five-member majority in Lo-
pez overturned the Gun-Free School Zones Act, but did not offer any pre-
cise formulation of the constitutional limit Congress transgressed in
enacting that legislation. 65 This is not surprising. As Justice Breyer's dis-
sent amply shows, even the original Gun-Free School Zones Act would
seem to have been self-evidently valid under the usual pre-Lopez doctrinal
formulation of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.66 Because govern-
ment reports indicate that a disturbing percentage of high school students
have been threatened with guns or have even had guns fired at them in
school, Congress could have rationally concluded that the presence of
guns in or near schools interferes with the educational process, resulting
in the schools' reduced capacity to prepare students for effective participa-
tion in the national economy.
67
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined, however, that Congress had
overstepped its regulatory authority. His opinion identifies three subject
areas that the Supreme Court has historically permitted Congress to regu-
late pursuant to the Commerce Clause, "the channels of interstate com-
merce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce" and "activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce." 68 National control of these categories, presuma-
bly, does not obliterate the distinction between national regulatory compe-
tence and the general police power of the states. The third of these
categories is the only one relevant to Lopez, but Chief Justice Rehnquist
argues that the Court, within this category, has routinely upheld the regu-
lation only of economic activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. 69 Because the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act did not explic-
itly narrow its purview to guns that, on a case-by-case basis, were shown to
have either traveled in commerce or affected commerce, Chief Justice
Rehnquist implies that the statute should not enjoy the nearly automatic
imprimatur that the Court attaches to statutes regulating economic
activities.
70
Brzonkala dissent, which argues for upholding the VAWA on commerce clause
grounds, does not reach the Fourteenth Amendment question. See id. at 911 n.1
(Motz, J., dissenting).
65. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-67.
66. See id. at 615-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (outlining pre-Lopez Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
67. See id. at 618-25 (applying rational basis analysis).
68. Id. at 558-59.
69. See id. at 560 (noting Court's history of routinely upholding statutes under
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Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically rejects the Government's prof-
fered justifications for the Gun-Free School Zones Act. He declines to sus-
tain the Act on the ground that guns near schools are threats in general to
interstate commerce either because of their collective contribution to
crime or because of the risks they pose to an educational process, which,
in turn, is critical to the success of interstate commerce. 71 He does not
deny that guns threaten interstate commerce in these ways. Rather, he
offers the following observations:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, sub-
stantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was
a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he
had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no [stat-
utory] requirement that his possession of the firearm have any
concrete tie to interstate commerce. To uphold the Govern-
ment's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the states.
72
The last quoted sentence echoes his earlier observation: "[I] f we were
to accept the Government's arguments, we [would be] hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."
73
Chief Justice Rehnquist's precise argument is not altogether clear
from these passages. A relatively modest interpretation of his position
would argue that, based on the actual record presented, the Court found
the connection in fact between gun possession near schools and interstate
commerce to be too tenuous to sustain a confident conclusion that Con-
gress' judgment in regulating gun possession on interstate commerce
grounds had been rational. Even if it is rational to treat guns near schools
as posing a significant risk to the educational process, and even if the na-
tional economy depends on effective education, it may simply not have
been self-evident, at least to the Lopez majority, that the particular damage
inflicted by the appearance of guns in schools is of the quality or quantity
that bears a likely relationship to the future capacity of present-day stu-
dents to be productive participants in interstate markets and enterprises.
Because this view of Rehnquist's argument would emphasize the degree of
care that courts should exercise in ascertaining an empirical basis for Con-
gress' judgments, let us call this the "fact sensitivity interpretation" of
Lopez.
71. See id. at 564-68 (discussing traditional control of education by States and
assertedly limitless reach of government's interpretation of Commerce Clause
power).
72. Id. at 567.
73. Id. at 564.
[Vol. 45: p. 201
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/1
FEDERALISM'S "OLD DEAL"
On the other hand, it may be that what provoked the majority's anxie-
ties about the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not really the empirical
speculation embodied in the inferences that would sustain Congress' judg-
ment. After all, the majority does not assert that the inferences adduced
by the government are untrue. Rather, it may be that what bothers Chief
Justice Rehnquist about the Government's inferences is that equally sound
inferences of an almost identical kind would go very far towards sustaining
virtually any national regulation of any local activity, including all material
aspects of K-12 schooling. In other words, it is not "pil[ing] inference
upon inference" per se that is constitutionally problematic, but rather the
accumulation of inferences that are qualitatively of a sort that wouldjustify
a great deal of other far-reaching regulation as well. I would call this the
"dual federalism interpretation" of Lopez, because it would attribute to the
case not so much a sensitivity to contextual facts as a categorical intention
to evict federal legislators from some exclusive domain of state policy
making.
The concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, seems to embrace the less ambitious fact-sensitivity approach
to Lopez, and to imply a new Commerce Clause "test" more clearly than
does the Rehnquist opinion.7 4 Justice Kennedy writes that, "unlike the
earlier cases" in which the Court has deferred to Congress, "neither the
actors [regulated by the Gun-Free School Zones Act] nor their conduct
has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of
the statute has an evident commercial nexus."75 A logical inference is that
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor would have voted to uphold the Gun-Free
School Zones Act if the conduct or actors regulated were commercial or if
the nexus between the conduct or actors and interstate commerce were
somehow more "evident." They would seem to require only an extra level
of empirical grounding to satisfy the Court's implementation of rationality
review regarding the national regulation of non-commercial activities.
In explicating the doctrinal shortcomings of Lopez, it is helpful to con-
sider the case in tandem with Brzonkala, its predictable offspring. It is an
offspring that the Supreme Court may yet disown-the Court has granted
certiorari in the case under the name United States v. Morrison.76 But,
whether or not the Fourth Circuit's reasoning survives Supreme Court re-
view, it amply illustrates the doctrinal problems Lopez creates, especially if
accorded a "dual federalism" interpretation.
As noted earlier, the issue in Brzonkala was the constitutionality of cre-
ating a federal damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. The
VAWA established a federal substantive right in "[a]ll persons within the
74. See, e.g., id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
2000]
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United States . . . to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gen-
der."77 Under the VAWA:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who com-
mits a crime of violence motivated by gender.., shall be liable to
the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
78
In deliberating on the VAWA, "Congress carefully . .. documented
the substantial effect that gender-based violence has on interstate com-
merce and the national economy."79 Congress determined that:
[C] rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial ad-
verse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential vic-
tims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in
interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in
places involved, in interstate commerce . . ., by diminishing na-
tional productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and de-
creasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.8 0
A key set of findings pertains to the economic costs of domestic vio-
lence against women. Congress found that "[o]ver 1 million women in
the United States seek medical assistance each year for injuries sustained
by their husbands or other partners."8 ' This phenomenon was "estimated
to cost employers '$3 to $5 billion annually due to absenteeism in the
workplace,"' as well as imposing additional burdens of "$5 to $10 billion a
year [spent] on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of do-
mestic violence."8 2 This accounting does not even include what Congress
noted as the additional "costs of lost careers, decreased productivity, fore-
gone educational opportunities, and long-term health problems" resulting
from domestic violence,
83
Putting aside for the moment Congress' other relevant findings in
support of the Act, the foregoing facts standing alone would seem to sus-
tain the VAWA readily under pre-Lopez doctrine. In enacting the VAWA,
Congress rationally concluded that acts of gender-based violence, viewed
cumulatively, place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that
the availability of a civil damages remedy would both reduce the resulting
77. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
79. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 913
(4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J. dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morri-
son, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999)
80. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
81. Id. at 914 (quoting S. RP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990))
82. Id. at 913-14 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 914 (quoting S. RP. No. 101-545, at 33).
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economic costs for the victims of violence and deter some degree of gen-
der-based brutality.
This is just the basis on which the Fourth Circuit dissenters would
have upheld the VAWA. Embracing what I have called the fact sensitivity
approach to Lopez, they distinguish the earlier case on the plausible
ground that Congress' deliberations leading to the VAWA provided the
very link between regulated conduct and interstate commerce that the
Court was unable to discern in Lopez.8 4 Although they do not quote Jus-
tice Kennedy's dissent as precisely setting the relevant standard, the con-
trast the dissenters draw between the VAWA and the Gun-Free School
Zones Act implicitly addresses the concurring Justices' concerns.8 5 The
dissenters recount the extensive documentation offered by Congress to
substantiate the nexus between gender-based violence and the economy-
documentation of a kind that Congress did not provide for the original
version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
8 6
The Fourth Circuit majority, however, rejects not only this reasoning,
but also the fact sensitivity orientation to Lopez. In the majority view, Lopez
is a dual federalism opinion, which creates a more ambitious and more
categorical rule. Namely, Congress may regulate a non-economic activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce only if the activity is "suffi-
ciently related to interstate commerce to satisfy the substantially affects
test" without relying "upon arguments which, if accepted, would eliminate
all limits on federal power and leave [a court] 'hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.' "87
According to the majority, the VAWA fails this test because gender-based
violence is non-economic activity and because the defense of its regulation
relies upon arguments that "pile inference upon inference" to connect
gender-based violence to interstate commerce in a manner that, if in-
dulged, could justify federal regulation of virtually all human activity.
88
As it happens, I believe that Lopez was incorrectly decided, even if
deemed to stand only for the fact-sensitivity approach that the Brzonkala
dissenters advocate. On certiorari, the Supreme Court may overturn
Brzonkala on factual grounds, following the Kennedy-O'Connor approach.
A majority could persuasively determine that Congress' deliberative record
draws a sufficiently compelling connection between the conduct regulated
and interstate commerce to verify the rationality of Congress' approach,
even under a heightened standard of rationality review. That approach to
Lopez is subject to the obvious criticism that what it demands from Con-
gress, and what it is likely to elicit, is too much in the nature of a formality.
It has generally been the Court's position that the constitutionality of stat-
84. See id. at 912-17 (detailing Congress' deliberations).
85. See id.
86. See id. (recounting Congress' documentation).




Shane: Federalism's Old Deal: What's Right and Wrong with Conservative J
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
utes does not depend upon a set of statutory findings or on evidence that
Congress' deliberations were especially thorough. 89 Asking judges to
make fine distinctions between just how much evidence is necessary to
convert plausibility into sufficient rationality for constitutional purposes is
also inviting judges, in the guise of neutral decisionmaking, to challenge
the wisdom of legislative choices they are not authorized to make. None-
theless, Lopez and Brzonkala are plainly distinguishable on this ground.
And, the fact-sensitivity approach to Lopez at least has the attractive feature
of not rendering that case an open-ended invitation to the federal judici-
ary to second-guess Congress on the justifiability of legislation whose foun-
dations are better assessed by legislators than by judges.
Presumably, the Fourth Circuit believes it has a more accurate read-
ing, if not of Lopez as written, then at least of the doctrine Chief Justice
Rehnquist might have advocated if he were not burdened by the necessity
of attracting the votes of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. If so, the fate of
Brzonkala in the Supreme Court will depend on the willingness of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor to take a more categorical stance regarding Con-
gress' authority to regulate non-economic activity.
Under the Fourth Circuit interpretation of Lopez, lawyers cannot save
the VAWA even by verifying the quantitative impact of gender-based vio-
lence on the economy. 90 Even if such a connection were demonstrated, it
would provide the sort of rationale for the VAWA that would threaten to
validate the "essentially limitless nature of congressional power."9 ' If fac-
tual investigation is the key to constitutionality, "the only conceivable limit
on congressional power to regulate an activity would be the significance of
that activity, because any significant activity or serious problem will have
an ultimate, though indirect, effect upon the economy, and therefore, at
least presumptively, upon interstate commerce as well." 92 The majority
purports to recognize that "Lopez undoubtedly preserves a healthy degree
of judicial deference to reasonable legislative judgments of fact."'93 But
Brzonkala effectively treats that deference as irrelevant if the pertinent "leg-
islative judgments of fact" would, in fact, sustain any significant breadth of
federal regulation with regard to local non-economic activity. The major-
ity's concern is not with ascertaining Congress' reasonableness, but in in-
sulating some part of the world of local health, safety and morals
regulation from congressional participation.
89. SeeTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) ("Congress is
not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an
administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review.").
90. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 843 (rejecting "a purely quantitative view of the
substantially affects test" that could "extend federal control to a vast range of
problems falling within even the most traditional areas of state concern").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 857.
[Vol. 45: p. 201
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/1
FEDERALISM'S "OLD DEAL'
Even if this were a justifiable judicial project, a subject to which I will
turn shortly, the interpretation of Lopez advocated by the Brzonkala major-
ity would result in doctrine so arbitrary that it cannot have much of a fu-
ture.94 It is a doctrine vulnerable to at least four fundamental challenges.
A. The Jurisdictional "Red Herring"
The arbitrariness of Brzonkala's reading of the Commerce Clause is
evident from the Fourth Circuit's express acknowledgment that, even
under Lopez, non-commercial acts with a specific interstate nexus are com-
prehensively subject to national regulation, so long as such regulation is
minimally rational.9 5 The VAWA, for example, authorizes criminal pun-
ishment for "any person who travels across a State line ... with the intent
to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner,
and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, intentionally com-
mits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or
intimate partner ...."96
But why should the addition of this interstate 'Jurisdictional element"
make any difference to the justification for Congress' intervention?
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional requirement, the criminal provisions of
the VAWA still overlap with the states' police powers. It is not likely that
any one act of traveling across a state line to commit domestic violence has
a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Nor is there necessarily any
commercial character to the act of moving interstate itself. Yet, the
Brzonkala majority concedes "that the legislative record . . .supports the
wisdom and legitimacy of many of the measures Congress enacted in the
Violence Against Women Act, such as ... the criminalization of violence
against women with an explicit interstate nexus ... ."97 From the stand-
point of protecting either federalism or interstate commerce, the majority
can give no reason why the same documentation that provides normative
support for the "wisdom and legitimacy" of creating a federal felony does
not equally support the "wisdom and legitimacy" of creating a federal
damages action. Nothing about the jurisdictional element changes the
normative underpinnings of the law.
98
94. For a discussion of the propriety of limiting of congressional power, see
infra notes 117-98 and accompanying text.
95. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 851 (noting that Congress had presented suffi-
cient evidence that violence against women affects interstate commerce to justify
portions of the VAWA).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
97. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 851.
98. Indeed, from the standpoint of federalism, the creation of a federal crimi-
nal offense-resulting in a seeming competition between state and federal officials
to control criminal conduct-would appear to be more problematic, even with a
jurisdictional limitation, than the creation of a private damages remedy. A private
damages remedy does not augur the kinds of harm that have been attributed to
the "inappropriate federalization" of criminal law. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw,
20001
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In this respect, it is noteworthy that, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez, Congress had already revised the Gun-Free School Zones
Act to proscribe gun possession near schools only if the firearm in ques-
tion "has moved in or ... otherwise affects interstate commerce."99 This
amendment presumably entails an extra element of proof for federal pros-
ecutors, but it hardly seems to limit the number of potential prosecutions
or the consequent presence of the federal government in the policing of
local firearms possession. Again, from the standpoint of federalism or
congressional regulatory authority, the jurisdictional element adds noth-
ing in principle to the justifiability of Congress' initiative.
B. The Irrelevant Distinction Between Commerce and Non-Commerce
Second, and just as basic, it is impossible to formulate a plausible nor-
mative basis for a distinction between commercial and non-commercial
activity in assessing Congress' regulatory powers from the perspective of
federalism.1 01° It is conventionally understood that the reason Congress is
authorized to regulate local commerce is because local commercial activity
can have a substantial relation to interstate commerce, and Congress is
appropriately empowered to attend to this substantial relationship when
necessary and proper either to promote interstate commerce or to prevent
interstate commerce from becoming the vehicle of some social harm. 10 1
But, whatever reason justifies national regulation of local commerce as
it affects interstate commerce, the same reason will pertain just as persua-
sively to national regulation of local non-commerce. If attending to a sub-
stantial relationship between local non-commercial activity and interstate
commerce helps to promote interstate commerce, then Congress should
be allowed to regulate. If attending to that relationship would help pre-
vent interstate commerce from becoming the vehicle of some social harm,
then Congress should be empowered to act on that basis.
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 24-43 (1998) (outlining America's dual
criminal justice system and adverse costs of inappropriate federalization).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A), amended by the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
100. See Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 2229-232 (discussing various interpre-
tations of "commerce"). There is a linguistic reading of "commerce among the
several states" that would include purely local commerce within that category. See
id. On that reading, a local commerce/non-commerce distinction with regard to
the Commerce Clause itself could perhaps be justified on the formal ground that
this particular clause explicitly authorizes the regulation of local commerce, but
not the regulation of local non-commerce. See id. Even so, Congress still enjoys
the power to make "all laws necessary and proper" for the execution of its commer-
cial regulatory powers; tinder this authority, removing all impediments to inter-
state commerce, whether commercial or non-commercial in their origin, would
appear to be equally valid. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 129 (discussing expansive-
ness enabled by "necessary and proper" clause).
101. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 129-30 (discussing textualist and originalist
readings of "necessary and proper" clause).
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Lopez and Brzonkala suggest this is a dangerous move because federal
regulation of non-commercial activity would "bid fair," to recall Chief jus-
tice Rehnquist's flowery phrase, to convert national regulatory power to a
general police power. 10 2 But the regulation of local non-commercial activ-
ity is no more or less a threat to state police power than the regulation of
local commercial activity. The power of states to promote the health,
safety and morals of the people has always been understood to embrace
the power of states to regulate their own economies. 10 3 When federal
commercial regulation preempts, limits or even supplements state com-
mercial regulation, it is interfering every bit as much in local police power
as would federal regulation of local non-commercial activity.
The commercial/non-commercial distinction likewise cannot bejusti-
fied on the ground that it is a reasonable tool for differentiating Congress'
authentically economic motives from congressional motives grounded in
concerns of public welfare or morality that are traditionally the focus of
state non-economic regulation. Compare, for example, a national anti-
prostitution statute with a hypothetical federal law purporting to mandate
compulsory education in some East Asian language as a prerequisite to
high school graduation.' 0 4 The first regulates economic activity and the
second not. Yet, the second law is obviously grounded in economic moti-
vations that probably do not animate the first. There is no reason consis-
tent with the Commerce Clause why Congress' commerce-driven
compulsion of Asian language education should be more suspect than its
morally driven regulation of prostitution, which is clearly what Lopez and
Brzonkala suggest. Or to take a more homely example, we should be more
suspicious of a hypothetical federal law that would regulate what a parent
may give his or her child as a weekly allowance than of the actual statute
making it a crime to possess a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. Yet, be-
cause of the plainly economic character of a monetary allowance, Lopez
and Brzonkala point the opposite way.
In fact, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial ac-
tivity does not map onto any value commonly associated with federalism.
Whether we value the diffusion of political authority, respect for diversity,
the capacity of states to innovate in making public policy, or the promo-
tion of government accessibility and accountability, federal preemption of
state authority to regulate non-economic activity is no more and no less
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
103. Cf City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("States are
accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their po-
lice powers .... ).
104. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (upholding federal
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threatening to those values than federal preemption of state authority to
regulate economic activity.'
0 5
C. Hyper-Formalism and the Slippery Slope
The third problem with Lopez and Brzonkala is their implication that
federal regulation of non-economic activity ought to be more suspect to
the extent its supporting rationale would also justify a great many other
regulations of non-economic activity. It is in this vein that the Brzonkala
majority is careful to distinguish its disapproval of the VAWA from a 1997
Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic En-
trances Act of 1994.106 Unlike the VAWA, which is based on the pervasive
economic effects of gender-based violence, the Clinic Entrances Act was
upheld, the Brzonkala majority says, because blocking abortion clinics is
related to a discrete and identifiable interstate economic enterprise,
namely, the interstate market in reproductive health services. 10 7 Thejusti-
fication for upholding the Clinic Entrances Act is not a justification that
would sustain every other regulation of non-economic activity, but only a
justification that would sustain other regulations of non-economic activity
that affect the interstate market in reproductive health services. It is thus a
permissible form ofjustification under the analysis of Lopez and Brzonkala.
This logic is wonderfully perverse. It implies that national legislation
is arguably most suspect precisely where the problems it addresses are
most pervasive. But the analysis suggests also just how easily the Brzonkala
version of the Lopez holding can be evaded. Instead of enacting what
might have been called the All Violence Against Women Act, Congress
should have enacted the Violence Against Women on College Campuses
Act, the Violence Against Women in Public Accommodations Act, the Vio-
lence Against Women in Automobile Factories Act, and so on, each to
prevent gender-based violence from burdening not commerce as a whole,
but rather the interstate markets for education, hotel rooms and
automobiles, respectively.
105. It has similarly been argued that the distinction between "comman-
deering" states and preempting state law also fails to map onto any important value
ordinarily associated with federalism. See generally Matthew D. Adler & Seth F.
Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT.
REV. 71, 71 (discussing anti-commandeering doctrine).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994); see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that obstruction of abortion clinic entrances "is closely con-
nected with, and has a direct and profound effect on, the interstate commercial
market in reproductive health care services").
107. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, at 840
n.9 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("It is plain that we did not uphold the statute in
Hoffman because the regulated conduct affected the national economy, but rather
because it directly affected a specific interstate market and was also 'closely and
directly connected with an economic activity."') (quoting Hoffman, 126 F.3d at
587), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
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Indeed, a moment's reflection on this approach reveals how a more
ingenious Congress might have provided for gun-free school zones. First,
Congress should have enacted the Gun-Free Private School Zones Act to
protect the interstate market in K-12 educational services (and, of course,
to protect private schools as efficacious and robust participants in inter-
state markets for books and educational supplies). Congress should then
have followed this statute with the Gun-Free Public School Zones Act. Hav-
ing realized that its first statute might give private schools an unfair advan-
tage in recruiting students, Congress would now assure the same level of
protection to public schools, not to address the much too general concern
of keeping children safe, 10 8 but to prevent interstate commerce in private
education from becoming a burden to the effective recruitment of stu-
dents by public schools. Congress could formalize its economic conclu-
sions in formal statutory findings, and words like "violence," "health" or
"public safety" need never appear.
If all this sounds too cute by half, it is nonetheless the kind of hyper-
formal rationalization that Lopez and Brzonkala would invite. Our courts
would do better to recognize that, once Congress has reasonably identi-
fied a national problem with pervasive economic effects, requiring Con-
gress to address that problem one economic sector at a time serves no
federalism value.
D. Usurpation of the Legislative Role
And this leads to the fourth fatal difficulty of our latest resurrection of
"old federalism." Because the commercial/non-commercial distinction is
so easily evaded on formal grounds, the Brzonkala reading of Lopez can
only be implemented in a serious way by courts willing to go beyond the
artificial formality of the distinction to something more substantive. But
whatever that "something" may be, the courts will find themselves either
second-guessing legislative motivation-a highly dubious form of adjudica-
tion when a law is fully defensible without reference to legislative motive-
or usurping the legislative role in making policy.' 0 9
For example, should Congress enact my hypothetical commercially
driven prohibitions on gun possession, a court might be tempted to see
past the formal niceties and reject the legislation on the ground that, re-
gardless of Congress' commercial discourse, the statute "in its effect...
aims" to protect children from gun violence, thus "exert[ing] a power as
to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend."' 10
The Supreme Court employed this very formulation to invalidate Con-
gress' 1916 statute purporting to limit the use of child labor, a law whose
108. One yearns here to insert the "emoticon" ubiquitously used on the in-
ternet to show that one is joking, namely, :-).
109. SeeJohn Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1222 (1970) (discussing courts' consideration of legislative
intent).
110. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
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impact on interstate commerce could hardly have been either more obvi-
ous or more direct.11 1 This disgraceful national experience alone ought
to caution us against permitting judges to base their assessments of consti-
tutional authority on malleable and often dubious characterizations of the
motives or purposes that underlie a statute.
Professor Deborah Merritt, among our most distinguished contempo-
rary commentators on the constitutional law of federalism, has suggested
that courts can avoid the artificialities entailed in policing a rigid categori-
cal distinction between commerce and non-commerce. 112 Rather than fo-
cus on whether regulated conduct does or does not categorically belong to
a discrete set of activities called "commerce," courts should employ what
mathematicians call "fuzzy logic," asking instead, "'[H] ow much is this con-
duct like commerce?' and 'how much like commerce must conduct be
before Congress can regulate it?' ' 1 3 The problem with this approach,
and an objection that Professor Merritt anticipates, is that ajudicial deter-
mination of "commerce-likeness" may seem little more than a judicial reas-
sessment of the justifiability of a national statute. 1 14 A court would ask
itself whether, in light of the competing arguments for national interven-
tion or state exclusivity in a particular area, some contested activity should
be deemed to resemble interstate commerce sufficiently to warrant con-
gressional action. Congress, however, when it enacts a statute, has already
answered this question, at least implicitly. Critics may distrust Congress'
answer because they perceive Congress to be an "interested party" in dis-
putes over the boundary between state and national regulatory author-
ity.1 1 5 But, so long as a statute is rationally designed either to promote
interstate commerce or to prevent interstate commerce from inflicting so-
cial harms, any deeper inquiry into the legitimacy of Congress' response
would be, in Chief Justice John Marshall's words, "to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground."' 16 This ought to be done only if there is some genuinely com-
pelling institutional need to enlarge the usual judicial role. As I discuss
below, no such need exists.
111. See id. (" [A] prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of
ordinary commercial commodities, to regulate the hours of labor of children in
factories and mines within the States... exerts a power as to a purely local matter
to which the federal authority does not extend.")
112. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 685, 688 (1996) (urging that courts avoid rigid formalistic distinctions be-
tween commerce and non-commerce).
113. Id.; see Merritt, supra note 14, at 745 (applying "fuzzy logic" analysis to
Lopez).
114. See Merritt, supra note 14, at 744 n.305 (discussing use of fuzzy logic).
115. See id. (arguing that policing this boundary should not be left to inter-
ested parties).
116. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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IV. LopEz AND ITS PROGENY AS MISGUIDED ACTIvISM
A. Are Lopez and Brzonkala Activist?
The unsoundness of the doctrinal maneuvers emanating from Lopez,
especially as interpreted by Brzonkala, are enough to belie ChiefJudge Wil-
kinson's claim that the current activist jurisprudence on federalism "holds
the promise to be... enduring and constructive .... "117 Even if judicial
activism on this subject were warranted, we should hardly applaud activism
that takes the form of doctrinal incoherence.
Before assessing the justifiability of any activist project for federalism,
however, it may be helpful to consider what observers of the judiciary
mean, or should mean, in labeling particular instances ofjudicial decision
as examples of "judicial activism." For example, I recently wrote a short
essay on the Brzonkala case for an electronic political journal, which elic-
ited one reader's reaction that ChiefJudge Wilkinson was wrong in calling
the Brzonkala decision activist because the Fourth Circuit was attempting
only to implement faithfully an originalist understanding of the Com-
merce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. 118
One might offer in response to this argumentJudge Richard Posner's
definition of judicial activism as the use of judicial power to second-guess
the policy determinations of the non-judicial branches of government.1 1, 9
On this understanding, Lopez, Brzonkala and every other decision that over-
turns a statute or executive action is activist. That definition, however,
seems conspicuously both over- and under-inclusive.
For example, it hardly seems activist for ajudge to overturn the initia-
tive of a non-judicial branch if there already exist relevant legal texts that,
conscientiously interpreted, more or less dictate such a result. Some theo-
rists of interpretation seem to deny the existence of such cases, but the
judge for whom I clerked, the late Alvin B. Rubin of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, once expressed to me, in terms I
think many judges would recognize, a contrary attitude. "Every judge," he
said, "with any genuine intellectual capacity at all knows that there are
some decisions that just 'won't write.'" If, following conventional norms
of judicial decisionmaking, an opinion upholding the disputed initiative
of a non-judicial branch "just 'won't write,"' then to label as "activist" the
judicial opinion that "will write" seems to obscure more than it clarifies.
On the other hand, if ajudge is self-consciously creative in generating
a largely unprecedented constitutional outcome, it hardly seems to be less
117. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 893 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Mor-
rison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
118. See Peter M. Shane, Judicial Activism, Conservative-style, INTELLECTUAL CAPI-
TAL.CoM (July 22-29, 1999) <http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issue259/
item5807.asp> (discussing Brzonkala).
119. See RicHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 211
(1985) (defining judicial activism).
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activist if the outcome favors, rather than overturns, the initiative of a non-
judicial branch. In Paul v. Davis,120 to take a Rehnquist-authored exam-
ple, the Court distorted relevant precedent beyond recognition in order
to uphold the discretion of city authorities to include individuals in public
postings of habitual shoplifters without affording such individuals a prior
hearing. 121 The Court's inventiveness fairly screamed its activist mind-set,
even though the result in this particular case was to expand, rather than
contract non-judicial administrative authority.
In the effort to analyze judicial behavior, it would seem to be the qual-
ity of conscious inventiveness, rather than the direction of a case outcome,
that sets judicial activism apart from judicial restraint. When my cyber-
space reader challenged ChiefJudge Wilkinson's claim of activism, he was
trying to argue this point-that cases like Lopez should not be deemed
activist because the Court, in my reader's view, is not inventing new consti-
tutional meaning, but returning to old constitutional meaning. But even
if there is some sense in which a constitutional decision uses the "interpre-
tive model," to use Professor Thomas Grey's words, or is "originalist," to
use a word that others prefer, it may well entail a degree of innovation that
deserves the "activism" label.
122
The recent federalism cases illustrate this point beautifully. Professor
Larry Lessig has used the word "translation" to describe what he discerns
as the Court's effort to restore, through new judicial doctrines, a set of
limits on government power that were inherent in social, economic polit-
ical or technological conditions that prevailed when the Constitution was
framed, but that have more or less evaporated under changed circum-
stances. 123 He speaks of Lopez as "an act of interpretive fidelity," and as
120. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
121. See id. at 694. In Paul, the Court concluded that the Louisville Police
Department did not deprive the plaintiff below of due process in erroneously in-
cluding him, without prior hearing, on a widely circulated Police Department
poster of "Active Shoplifters." See id. To reach this result, the majority had to
distinguish Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the Court
held that Wisconsin had denied due process by permitting local officials to post
summarily the names of individuals determined. to be engaged in "excessive drink-
ing." See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708. Although the Constantineau decision rested explic-
itly on the impact of state-imposed disgrace on the plaintiff's reputation, the
Court, in Paul, denied that damage to reputation was the gravamen of the holding
in the earlier case. See id. The Paul majority said that the Wisconsin scheme impli-
cated the Due Process Clause only because citing Constantineau as an habitual
drunk imposed a state legal obligation on liquor merchants not to sell her liquor.
See id.
122. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution , 27 STAN. L. REv.
703, 703 (1975). The point has been made that all plausible theories of constitu-
tional interpretation are "interpretivist." See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 204 n.1 (1980) (discussing constitu-
tional interpretation). As Grey himself has written: "We are all interpretivists; the
real arguments are not over whether judges should stick to interpreting, but over
what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should adopt."
Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984).
123. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 131-135.
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"an effort to reconstruct something from the framing balance [of state
and federal power] to be preserved in the current interpretive context."
1 24
Lessig is absolutely clear in describing this project as one of invention, a
"constructivist" effort, and so, I presume, he would accept that acts ofjudi-
cial "translation" are activist.12 5 Yet, like jurists who self-consciously speak
in similar terms, Professor Lessig portrays this activism as significantly con-
strained because it seeks to create a balance of rights or powers that is
"equivalent" to "the original balance." 126
I think this formulation greatly underestimates the inventiveness in
which modem courts engage when they purport to translate founding
commitments into contemporary doctrines. Lessig uses the notion of
translation metaphorically, to imply that once the act of judicial construc-
tion is completed, the translator has produced something equivalent to
the intended meaning of the founding generation. 12 7 Even translators,
however, do not speak of their work as producing equivalents. As legal
comparativist Vivian Curran puts the matter:
Translations from formal language to formal language, from dis-
course to discourse, and from connotation or referential sources
of concepts from one legal culture to another, all involve catego-
rization. When translating, one discovers that one transmits only
a portion of the original. Generally one selects among various
possible subsets of the original, making value judgments as to
which aspects of the original sign should be preserved through
triage. The text in translation will trigger associations based on
those selections, but they will be associations often not present in
the original text, triggered by the signifiers used in the transla-
tion, such that a transmutation occurs from the original, making
the translation a new and distinct product.
1 28
Professor Curran also points out, "divergences of meaning" between
the original language and its translated version are most likely to occur
when the language being translated does not correspond to "objects ame-
nable to visible or tactile perception."129 Legal categories like "federal-
ism" are especially amenable to divergences of meaning.
The idea that the Court in Lopez is re-creating the Framers' intended
balance of state and federal power under changed circumstances isolates,
as the one changed circumstance worthy of legal response, the unprece-
dented interconnectedness of virtually all social and economic activity with
the consequence that the national power to regulate commerce among
124. Id. at 129.
125. See id. at 128-31 (describing Lopez).
126. See id. at 134.
127. See id. at 134-35 (discussing Lessig's concept of "translation").
128. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in
U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 43, 56-57 (1998) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 50.
20001
27
Shane: Federalism's Old Deal: What's Right and Wrong with Conservative J
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the states can, if understood literally, become a national power to regulate
everything. What this misses, however, is that it is not just the national
economy and the national government that would appear unrecognizable
to the Framers. So, too, would our state governments, whose powers and
competencies have grown over two centuries to something the late Eight-
eenth Century could hardly have imagined.
Over the past half century, the rates of growth in state expenditure
and state employment far outpaced their federal equivalents. It is hardly
self-evident that the Framers would have worried anxiously about the self-
protective capacities of states that collectively employ over 4.7 million peo-
ple and engage in expenditures that, together with those of local govern-
ments, amount to roughly 1.35 trillion dollars per year.130 State licensing
authorities now constrain the travel and economic activities of virtually all
adults, and, armed with comprehensive data bases of their citizens' where-
abouts (and often of their health, income and family status as well), states
can reach far more deeply into the lives of individual citizens than any
national government would have dreamed of in 1789. At a general level,
our founders' fears of tyranny and their belief in the vitality of local com-
munity and accessible government remain salient today. But it is fanciful
to think that we can somehow recalibrate the formal authorities of na-
tional or state regulators and re-create anything meaningfully equivalent
to the diffusion of power that the Framers would have recognized in their
utterly different world. It is no accident that a hallmark of many activist
opinions is bad historical analysis. The contrived attempt to produce a
narrative of legal continuity requires the Court either to emphasize histori-
cal questions that are irrelevant or to minimize or misinterpret the evi-
dence that matters.
131
The task of operationalizing 1789 federalism in a Twenty-first Century
America is not a task of translation, but one of renovation. It is a task of
redesigning, whether marginally or comprehensively, the legal doctrines,
structures and processes that embody old values so that those values are
given their most attractive form under the circumstances of our own age.
The project of renovation is linked to a dominant tradition in American
constitutional law, which I have elsewhere called "aspirationalism." 13 2 As-
pirationalism views "the Constitution as a signal of the kind of government
under which we would like to live," and seeks to interpret the "Constitu-
tion over time to reach better approximations of that aspiration."
13 3 If
130. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
331 tbl. 530 (1998) (showing numbers of state employees); id. at 307 tbl. 499)
(showing state expenditures).
131. . See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108
YALE L.J. 2115 (1999) (critiquing narrative of continuity that purports to explain
constitutional developments during New Deal).
132. See Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
531, 550 (1988) (discussing asperationalism).
133. Id. This article further states that:
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that's what our conservative judicial activists are doing, striving for a better
approximation based on changed understanding of the constitutionally
embedded value of federalism, then I have sympathy with their impulse.
The aspirations long linked with federalism-diversity, innovation, polit-
ical responsiveness, insulation from political oppression-are values worth
keeping up to date. The problem, and now I return to Lopez and
Brzonkala, is not only that the doctrinal tools of renovation that they have
invented in recent Commerce Clause cases are arbitrary, as I have already
argued. It is also that this particular aspirational project is ill-suited to the
courts. Judicial activism ought be undertaken only when our constitu-
tional system exhibits a compelling institutional need for the judiciary to
second-guess elected political authorities and when the constitutional aspi-
ration in question can be implemented through workable, coherent legal
doctrine. Neither of these conditions justifies the current judicial activism
on behalf of federalism.
B. Conservative Judicial Activism as a Misguided Project
According to Chief Judge Wilkinson, the current era of judicial activ-
ism is best assessed against the background of two other periods ofjudicial
activism in this century. During the first stage of judicial activism-the
Lochner era-courts deployed the so-called "liberty of contract" doctrine to
strike down laws enacted for the benefit of women, children and labor.
That era, he writes, "is still widely disparaged for its mobilization of per-
sonal judicial preference in opposition to state and federal social welfare
legislation."1
34
The second stage, animated by the civil-rights movement, saw "more
and more citizens turn[ing] to the courts to vindicate a wide variety of
This vision treats as essential to constitutional understanding the broad
normative purposes that the Constitution invokes: "to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." To use John Marshall's words,
those purposes are vindicated by remembering "it is a constitution we are
expounding," that in a constitution, "only its great outlines should be
marked," and that our constitution was "intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." ... Aspirationalism is not tantamount to regarding the Constitu-
tion as perfect, or perfectible through ingenious reading.... Aspiration-
alism does insist, however, that new or evolving understandings of the
Constitution may not require formal amendment for their implementa-
tion. Cultural change, that is change in social understanding, may make
certain reasoned arguments compelling to later generations that earlier
generations did not foresee.
Id. at 550-51 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 34-37 (1984) (expressing similar position).
134. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 890 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (discussing periods of judicial activism),
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
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individual liberties."' 35 This period, in Chief Judge Wilkinson's view, was
justly criticized for the institutional strains it caused and for its negative
impact on state authority.136 But "many of its individual decisions were
overdue and salutary," including a number of 'Judicial landmarks" whose
"position in the pantheon of our jurisprudence is secure."1 3 7
Chief Judge Wilkinson argues that current judicial activism will be
"enduring and constructive" like the second era, rather than an "aggres-
sive intrusion into the activities of coordinate branches" like the first.
138
This is so for three reasons. First, Chief Judge Wilkinson says, current ac-
tivism does not foreclose all elected officials from dealing with national
problems; it requires only that the elected officials be officials of states or
localities. 139 Hence, it is preferable to the Lochner period, in which the
impact of substantive due process was to remove a variety of pressing social
problems from the purview of elected policy makers altogether. 140 Sec-
ond, he asserts, current efforts do not aim at "an exceedingly narrow" and
artificial definition of commerce, just some understanding of the Com-
merce Clause that gives the courts a significant role in enforcing its lim-
its. 14 1 This effort to find a proper judicially enforceable limitation of the
Commerce Clause is imperative because, otherwise, the courts would be-
come "textually selective" in their commitment to judicial review. 142 This,
according to Chief Judge Wilkinson, would result in a "complete abdica-
tion" of the judiciary's "interpretive duty.' 43 Finally, unlike Lochner-style
activism, current activism does not cater to a single constituency, such as
big business. 144 The first of these points is incomplete. The others are
wrong.
It may be consoling to devotees of representative government that
Lopez and Brzonkala disable political initiative only at the federal level, and
not at the state and local level. Removing national issues from the na-
tional political stage, however, is hardly better than removing them from
political resolution altogether if the authorities left to resolve those issues
lack the capacity to do so effectively. It is transparent that, on their own,
states have not been able to eliminate either threats to school safety from
firearms or the plague of gender-based violence.
In this connection, it is worth recalling the origins of the Commerce
Clause itself. The Committee on Detail formulated Congress' authority to
135. Id. at 891.
136. See id. at 892 (discussing second stage of judicial activism).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 893, 895.
139. See id. at 895 (discussing requirements of current judicial activism).
140. See id. (discussing current judicial activism).
141. See id. at 894 (discussing current definition of Commerce Clause).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 893 (distinguishing current activism from Lochner-style
activism).
[Vol. 45: p. 201
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/1
FEDERALISM'S "OLD DEAL"
regulate interstate commerce as part of its effort to fulfill the Philadelphia
delegates' resolution that Congress be empowered "to legislate in all cases
to which the separate states are incompetent .... 145 From this perspec-
tive, it is hardly faithful to the animating impulse behind Article I to inca-
pacitate Congress from addressing problems that can be addressed
effectively only with the participation of the national government.
As for his second point, there is no foundation for arguing that the
federal judiciary needs to find federalism-based judicially enforceable lim-
its on Congress' Commerce Clause authority in order to avoid abdicating
the judicial review power. ChiefJudge Wilkinson's argument on this point
is, frankly, so odd in light of our constitutional history that I feel com-
pelled to quote him lest it be imagined that I am simply fabricating his
position:
[T] he real challenge to courts is to refrain from being textually
selective. Yet .... it is hard to understand how one can argue for
giving capacious meanings to some constitutional provisions
while reading others out of the document entirely. Here, appel-
lants suggest that we give a reading that would rob all meaning
from the phrase "Commerce... among the several States," giving
Congress a blanket power simply "To regulate." It seems patently
inconsistent to argue for a Due Process Clause that means a great
deal and a Commerce Clause that means nothing. How one
clause can be robust and the other anemic is a mystery when
both clauses, after all, are part of our Constitution.
146
The fact, however-and Chief Judge Wilkinson must surely know
this-is that the Court has always been "textually selective" in precisely the
way he decries. Among the texts the Court has read in at best "anemic"
fashion are the promise to each state of a republican form of govern-
ment,147 and the acknowledgment in the Ninth Amendment of
unenumerated rights still "retained by the people."' 48 In similar fashion,
145. 1 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 21 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (May 29) (notes of James Madison). For a thoughtful sugges-
tion for reformulating Commerce Clause doctrine to reflect its origins, see
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional
Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206, 1210-17 (1998).
146. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 894-95 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
147. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) (declin-
ing to reach merits of Guarantee Clause claim on grounds of nonjusticiability).
For arguments that the Guarantee Clause would provide a better ground than
does the Tenth Amendment for the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence,
see Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New
Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 815 (1994); Deborah Jones Mer-
ritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." Id. "[T]he Ninth Amendment has not been used
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the Court has refused to say whether the textual commitment of treaty
approval power in the Senate has any implications for congressional au-
thority to participate in treaty termination.1 49 Within this decade, the
Court has held that it has no authority to interpret the procedural implica-
tions of the Senate's explicit textual authority to "try" impeachments.
1 50
These are hardly small matters or trivial bits of constitutional text.
Yet, the American commitment to judicial review has always co-existed
with the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that some portions of the con-
stitutional text are exclusively left to the elected branches of the national
government for their authoritative interpretation and enforcement. Mar-
bury v. Madison,151 the very decision that first asserted the federal courts'
power of judicial review, states that there are constitutional powers vested
in the President for which he is accountable "only to his country in his
political character, and to his own conscience."' 52 In short, the idea that
textual selectivity is inconsistent with judicial review is totally at odds with
the tradition of judicial review as it has evolved in the United States.
Moreover, the kind of deference to Congress embodied in the Court's
post-New Deal, pre-Lpez case law merely reduces, rather than eliminates
the courts' opportunities to enforce limits on Congress' authority. For ex-
ample, no one argues that the Framers intended Congress to use its com-
mercial regulatory powers to destroy state governments as significantly
autonomous governments. I presume, therefore, that it would be uncon-
stitutional for Congress to deprive states of certain authorities or capacities
that, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, are "indisputably 'attrib-
utes of state sovereignty.'"153 For example, however rational it might be
to do so, Congress could not eliminate bicameral state legislatures, insist
that states locate their capitals in their most convenient ports or abandon
property taxation in favor of income taxation.1 54 One hopes that this
as the basis for defining rights of individuals and invalidating either federal or state
laws .... References to the Amendment in the Supreme Court appear to be only
in dicta or opinions of individual Justices." JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 400 n.10 (5th ed. 1995).
149. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005-06 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(holding Senate's role in treaty abrogation to present nonjusticiable political
question).
150. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (holding procedural
sufficiency of Senate's procedure for taking evidence in judicial impeachment trial
to be nonjusticiable political question).
151. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
152. Id. at 166.
153. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)).
154. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 586 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing limits of congressional power). Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion states:
Congress might rationally conclude that the location a State chooses for
its capital may affect interstate commerce, but the Court has suggested
that Congress would nevertheless be 'barred from dictating that location
because such an exercise of a delegated power would undermine the
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principled limitation on Congress' authority to regulate commerce among
the several states is a limitation Congress will hardly ever be tempted to
transgress. But it is not much of an argument against a particular interpre-
tation of the Constitution that it will only infrequently afford judges
whatever gratification comes from deploying constitutional text to invali-
date national statutes.
As for Chief Judge Wilkinson's final point-that the new activism im-
proves on the Lochner era because "the outcomes of the current era have
not consistently favored a particular constituency"-he is, however inad-
vertently, misleading. 15 5 First, the problem with Lochnerjurisprudence was
not that it favored a particular constituency, but rather that it favored a
particular constituency that needed no judicial assistance to assure a fair
hearing in the arena of electoral politics. Neither "big business," nor
America's propertied elite more generally, needs systematic court protec-
tion against federal and state legislative bodies indifferent to their inter-
ests. This stands in marked contrast, of course, to the position of African-
Americans, among others, whose treatment with indifference or outright
hostility by our elected institutions provided a central justification for judi-
cial activism on behalf of civil rights.
15 6
The current era likewise favors a particular constituency. It is not an
economic faction, but a cultural and ideological constituency, comprising
those who reflexively oppose activist national government. Such opposi-
tion is as reliable a feature of contemporary cultural conservatism as is
enthusiasm for school uniforms and movie ratings.
Part of what made Brzonkala a predictable en banc decision was its
origin in the Fourth Circuit.' 57 That court's current majority very much
represents a conservative movement in constitutional jurisprudence that
has been catalyzed in no small part by the Federalist Society since the early
state sovereignty inherent in the Tenth Amendment. Similarly, Congress
in the exercise of its taxing and spending powers can protect federal sav-
ings and loan associations, but if it chooses to do so by the means of
converting quasi-public state savings and loan associations into federal
associations, the Court has held that it contravenes the reserved powers of
the States because the conversion is not a reasonably necessary exercise of
power to reach the desired end.
Id. (citations omitted).
155. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 893 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (discussing periods of judicial activism),
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
156. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(discussing hostility toward minorities). Important commentaries on the famous
"footnote 4" include JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-61 (1980), and
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1985).
157. See generally Mark Hansen, Mid-Atlantic Drift, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1999, at 66;
Carrie Johnson, Testing the Limits: 4th Circuit's conservative push to the U.S. Supreme
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1980s. 15 8 The author of the majority opinion in Brzonkala, Judge Michael
Luttig, is an alumnus of both the Reagan White House Counsel's office
and of the Bush Justice Department, 159 which, from 1981 to 1992, were
significant sites of conservative ferment in constitutional theory. 160 On
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist may be driven to moderate
his understandings of constitutional doctrine by his need to woo votes
from the instinctively conservative, but largely anti-ideological Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor. The Fourth Circuit, however, is often able to
158. See Statement of Purpose of Federalist Society for Law and Policy Studies <http:/
/fed-soc.org/who.htm> (setting out group's purpose). The "Statement of Pur-
pose" of the Federalist Society for Law and Policy Studies, founded by current
Northwestern University Law Professor Steven G. Calabresi and attorney Lea S.
Liberman, reads:
Law schools and the legal profession are currently strongly dominated by
a form of orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized and
uniform society. While some members of the academic community have
dissented from these views, by and large they are taught simultaneously
with (and indeed as if they were) the law.
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of
conservatives and libertarians interested in the current state of the legal
order. It is founded on the principles that the state exists to preserve
freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our
Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
ciary to say what the law is, not what it should be. The Society seeks both
to promote an awareness of these principles and to further their applica-
tion through its activities.
This entails reordering priorities within the legal system to place a
premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the rule of law. It
also requires restoring the recognition of the importance of these norms
among lawyers, judges, and law professors. In working to achieve these
goals, the Society has created a conservative intellectual network that ex-
tends to all levels of the legal community.
Id. It testifies to the Society's networking success that its current Board of Direc-
tors is chaired by former judge Robert H. Bork and Senate Judiciary Committee
chair, Orrin Hatch (R-UT). Other members include former Counsel to the Presi-
dent C. Boyden Gray, who served as George Bush's Counsel during the Reagan as
well as Bush Administrations, and former Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese,
III. Professor Calabresi's current fellow national co-chair is Rep. David McIntosh
(R-IN), an adviser to former Vice President Dan Quayle.
Through publications and symposia, as well as its organizational activities, the
Federalist Society has made so constructive a contribution to the development of
conservative legal thought (and to the intellectual resources available to the legal
community more generally), that it remains an enduring mystery why supporters
of a more progressive constitutionalism have not emulated its model. The time for
a Brennan-Marshall Society for Law and Public Policy is long overdue.
159. See 4th circuit nominee named, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1991, at
7 (discussing Luttig's appointment).
160. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATrORNEY GENERAL-ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK (1987)
(embodying efforts of Meese Justice Department to promulgate official view of
how all federal lawyers should approach issues of constitutional interpretation);
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION (1988) (same); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES
AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988) (same).
[Vol. 45: p. 201
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muster a comfortable majority of judges around an ideologically purer
form of conservative constitutionalism. 16 1 An available method, as exem-
plified by Brzonkala, is to embrace the most ambitiously conservative ver-
sion of a Supreme Court precedent that is arguably more moderate, and
then to write as if the ambitious rendition is the only faithful interpreta-
tion. Not surprisingly, when this happens, the resulting opinion can
sound more like a manifesto than a judicial exposition of the law.
The "movement" character ofJudge Luttig's opinion in Brzonkala is as
evident in its tone as in its substance. Five aspects of his prose are espe-
cially worthy of note because they so strongly signal a sense of political
mission that inappropriately exceeds conventional understandings of the
judicial role.
The most obvious, albeit the least toxic, of these signals is the ex-
traordinary level to which the Brzonkala opinion raises the phenomenon of
protesting too much. When a judge requires sixty-four pages of double-
columned, single-spaced prose to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a
single non-technical provision of federal law, that alone may well suggest
he is reaching too far.162 In this case, the author's repetitiveness does not
strengthen his argument. For example, from the uncontested factual rec-
ord of widespread violence against women and of the extraordinary eco-
nomic impacts of such violence, it takes only three implications to connect
the VAWA to interstate commerce. The first, which seems self-evident, is
that some significant portion of the multi-billion dollar national economic
impact inflicted by violence against women implicates interstate com-
merce. The second is that some non-trivial portion of the adverse eco-
nomic impact on the interstate economy is traceable to violence
"motivated by gender" within the meaning of the VAWA. The third is that
the availability of damage actions against perpetrators will either deter
161. See, e.g., Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 240 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (dismissing sex discrimination claim by two women campus police of-
ficers); Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 260-74 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting chal-
lenges to capital sentencing), affd, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000); United States v.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that admissibility of confes-
sions in federal court is governed by statute providing that confession is admissible
if voluntarily given, not by rule of Miranda), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999);
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 1998) (invalidating Driver's Privacy
Protection Act), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting assertion of FDA authority to
regulate tobacco), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
162. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,
825-89 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (discussing issue at length), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). The notable exception is Myers v.
United States, which held that Congress could not condition the President's author-
ity to remove Postmasters General on the consent of the Senate to remove an of-
ficer to whose appointment it had been required to give advice and consent. See
272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). Chief Justice Taft might be excused his verbosity on the
ground that, as a constitutional scholar and as a former President, he had special
interest in definitively resolving the constitutional issue that had also furnished the
pretext for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson.
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such violence or mitigate the degree to which its victims will be injured in
their capacity to participate in the interstate economy. None of these in-
ferences is remotely counterintuitive, but it is against this reasoning that
Judge Luttig invokes the Rehnquist warning about "pil[ing] inference
upon inference."' 63 One might reasonably object, I think, that three in-
ferences is barely a stack, much less a pile. But the rhetorical irony-espe-
cially in light of the piling metaphor-is thatJudge Luttig actually employs
the Rehnquist phrase, or quotes it verbatim from other judicial opinions, a
total of eleven times in the course of his opinion.
1 64
Less humorously, the majority opinion also combines a manifest arro-
gance with a thinly veiled claim of moral heroism, in which the author
implicitly casts his colleagues and himself as defenders of legal purity
standing firm against a cabal that includes both the appellants and the
dissenters. 165 The arrogance does not go unremarked by the dissent:
As the opening words of its opinion demonstrate, the majority
steadfastly refuses to recognize the constraints placed upon the
judiciary by the separation of powers. In purporting to act on
behalf of "We the People" in striking Subtitle C [of the VAWA]-
an act of the people's duly elected legislature-the majority seeks
to augment its limited judicial authority with a representative au-
thority that it does not in fact possess.
166
But it is not only the will of "We, the People" that the majority believes
to be at stake in its opinion. Consider the following lines from the major-
ity's penultimate paragraph, which defy paraphrase:
We are not unaware that in invalidating section 13981 today, we
invalidate a provision of a statute denominated the "Violence
Against Women Act." No less for judges than for politicians is
the temptation to affirm any statute so decorously titled. We live
in a time when the lines between law and politics have been pur-
posefully blurred to serve the ends of the latter. And, when we,
as courts, have not participated in this most perniciously machia-
vellian of enterprises ourselves, we have acquiesced in it by
others, allowing opinions of law to be dismissed as but pro-
nouncements of personal agreement or disagreement. The judi-
cial decision making contemplated by the Constitution, however,
unlike at least the politics of the moment, emphatically is not a
function of labels. If it were, the Supreme Court assuredly would
163. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 837 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549,
567 (1995)).
164. See id. at 837, 838, 840, 844, 845, 845 n.13, 847, 847, 855, and 858 n.22
(quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
165. See, e.g., id. at 889 (contrasting majority opinion with "[a] most perni-
ciously machiavellian of enterprises").
166. Id. at 921 (Motz, J., dissenting).
236 [Vol. 45: p. 201
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not have struck down the "Gun-Free School Zones Act," the "Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act," the "Civil Rights Act of 1871," or
the "Civil Rights Act of 1875." And if it ever becomes such, we
will have ceased to be a society of law, and all the codification of
freedom in the world will be to little avail.
16 7
In this hyperbolical and significantly incoherent passage, the Fourth
Circuit majority actually casts itself as a heroic force of resistance to the
merely superficial appeal of protecting women from violence, and claims a
role in saving society from itself.
168
It is additionally distressing that Judge Luttig quite clearly takes this
battle personally. He scolds the plaintiff, the Justice Department and the
dissenters in personal terms as if their advocacy for a moderate reading of
Lopez were an act of lese majestj against the forces of constitutional pu-
rity.' 6 9 He seems to imagine that the appellants and the dissenters share a
personal connection, as a result of which the dissent's arguments will actu-
ally have emotional implications for appellants. He writes that the dissent
"lay[s] bare appellants' ... standard of review to an extent that will surely
prove disquieting to appellants," and that the dissent "stands in what we
suspect will be, for appellants uncomfortable testament to this infinite
reach of appellants' argument."' 70 It is mysterious why Judge Luttig
would advert to the appellants' supposed reactions to the dissent. One
yearns to have been able to assure Judge Luttig that nothing about the
dissenting opinion would prove either disquieting or uncomfortable to
167. Id. at 889.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., id. at 880. Although the scolding tone runs throughout the
opinion, an especially crystalline example appears in Judge Luttig's discussion of
Brzonkala's Fourteenth Amendment argument:
In summary, although appellants expressly contend that Harris and
the Civil Rights Cases are distinguishable, have tacitly been overruled or
modified, and have been repudiated by subsequent authorities, it is ap-
parent from the character of each of these arguments and the "authori-
ties" upon which they rely that appellants really have no argument other
than that we should ignore these decisions because they are "too old" to be
controlling. To the point of histrionics, in fact, appellants incant that
Harris and the Civil Rights Cases are simply "outdated,""century-old," from
the "1870's [sic] and 1880's," "19th century" cases, and of little interest to
"modern courts," or those with "modern" views about the proper scope of
Congress' powers. Indeed, the government in its principal brief cites
Harris and the Civil Rights Cases but once, and that citation is a parentheti-
cal embedded within footnote. As we are confident appellants appreci-
ate, however, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent explicit
reliance upon both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases in City of Boerne, we
are not at liberty simply to conclude that these cases do not represent the
Court's current view of congressional power to regulate exclusively pri-
vate conduct under Section 5.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 857, 859.
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the appellants other than its failure to garner six, rather than four votes
from an eleven-judge bench.
Moreover, it is troubling to consider the condescending, even insult-
ing tone that Judge Luttig directs against both appellants and dissenters.
He describes appellants' "invocations of 'rational basis review' as "inces-
sant," and their Fourteenth Amendment argument as "maundering" and
marked by "incant[ation]" "to the point of histrionics.' 71 He chastises
them for merely "tepid" acknowledgment of the distinction between eco-
nomic and non-economic activity and characterizes their paraphrase of
Congress' reasoning as manifesting "an understandable-though barely
excusable-reluctance to quote it in its entirety."172 He also suggests that
their perspective on Lopez verges on unethical misrepresentation. 173 For
Judge Luttig, the interpretive disagreement over the reach of the Com-
merce Clause-or, more accurately, the reach of Lopez-is invested with a
depth of moral significance more readily associated with religious crusades
than with legal interpretation.
Finally, one must be excused also for concluding that one reason
Judge Luttig imagines the appellants and the dissenters to be arrayed
against him on a personal level is that Brzonkala is a case about the VAWA
and both the plaintiff, Christy Brzonkala, and the author of the dissenting
opinion, Diana Gribbon Motz, are women. 174 Judge Luttig feels com-
pelled to recite a lengthy passage from Judge Motz's opinion because it is
"so startling in its quaint innocence."'175 His scolding for "histrionics" ster-
eotypically attributes to the appellants an excessive emotionalism, which
he implicitly contrasts with the court's allegiance to duty and reason.
176
Christy Brzonkala, for her part, along with the Justice Department, seeks
to "emasculate the judicial role in the determination of whether Congress
has exceeded its constitutional authority." 177 Such truculence is not, to
use ChiefJudge Wilkinson's phrase,judicial activism that is "measured and
171. Id. at 857, 859, 870, 880.
172. Id. at 832 n.5, 850 n.16.
173. Cf id. at 854 n.18, 856 n.20 (comparing appellants' interpretation of
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) with actual text from Lopez decision).
Judge Luttig also infers from the appellants' strategy of offering alternative theo-
ries in support of their position that they are knowingly advancing legally insup-
portable arguments. See id. at 873 (stating appellants are motivated to argue in
alternative because they are "[e]vidently aware of the speciousness of these distinc-
tions and, ultimately, of the fundamental premise on which they rest").
174. Although the seven-four Brzonkala vote marked a perfect split between
the Fourth Circuit's seven Republicans and its four Democrats, one wonders
whether the majority opinion might have differed somewhat in tone if authored by
the Court's one female Republican appointee, Judge Karen Williams, even though
she, like Judge Luttig, is staunchly conservative.
175. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 860.
176. Id. at 880.
177. Id. at 858.
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cautious."1 78 It is a culture war barrage that masquerades as legal formal-
ism. Contrary to Chief Judge Wilkinson, it very much substantiates the
anxiety that the third Twentieth Century era of judicial activism is in-
tended to advance the cultural agenda of a particular ideological
constituency.1
79
But the weakness of ChiefJudge Wilkinson's analysis lies in more than
the defects of the arguments he makes. It lies also in the critical point he
ignores, namely, that the era of civil rights-oriented judicial activism, un-
like the Lochner era, had a weighty institutional justification. As I have al-
ready noted, the Court was responding to the systemic difficulties posed
for historically disadvantaged groups in eliciting genuine responsiveness
from the non-judicial branches of state and federal government. By now
embarking on a program of judicial activism for the states, the courts are
not filling any comparably compelling institutional need.
In writing the opinion overturning National League of Cities,180 the late
Justice Blackmun invoked the argument made famously by Herbert
Wechsler, and more recently by Dean Jesse Choper, that the primary con-
stitutional protections for federalism lay in the structure and composition
of the national government itself.' 8 ' Without rehearsing the details of this
178. Id. at 898 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). Judge Luttig writes with objec-
tionable and arguably gendered belligerence thatJudge Motz and those who join
her are "candid about their prostrate deference to congressional pronounce-
ments." Id. at 847. Wondering whether I might be springing too quickly to an
inference that this phrase is both singularly insulting to a fellow judge, and, in
context, inappropriately sexualized, I checked on March 10, 2000 to see whether
the phrase "prostrate deference" had ever before appeared in any judicial opinion.
A search of the "ALLCASES" and "ALLCASES-Old" WESTLAW databases pro-
duced no other state or federal judicial opinion in which the phrase appears.
179. A common and disquieting feature of politically motivated diatribes is
smearing one's opponents by attributing to them one's own behavior. Judge Lut-
tig accuses the appellants of repetition to the point of "incantation," yet he quotes
"pil[ing] inference upon inference" eleven times. Id. at 880. For a further discus-
sion of Judge Luttig's use of "pil[ing] inference upon inference," see supra note
164 and accompanying text. He anticipates that the dissent will disquiet the appel-
lants, without apparently wondering how a rape victim might react to being told by
the majority that she is trying to "emasculate" the court. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at
858. He accuses appellants of trying to disguise the true import of Lopez without
ever providing his own account of what led Justice Kennedy to a separate concur-
rence elaborating what he and Justice O'Connor have determined is the "limited
holding" of Lopez. See id. at 919 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring)). It is hard to imagine that any "histrionics" in the appellants' briefs
could outdo Judge Luttig's own over-the-top penultimate paragraph. Id. at 880.
And, anticipating that critics might infer a political agenda behind the Fourth Cir-
cuit's view of the law, he offers in that final paragraph a preemptive characteriza-
tion of any such criticism as "this most perniciously machiavellian of enterprises."
Id. at 889. In every respect, this opinion stands in disconcerting opposition to any
recognizable ideal of judicial temperament.
180. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
181. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-55 (arguing that state sovereignty is protected
by structure of federal government); see, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
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argument, it bears noting that there are today few features of our political
life more conspicuous than the consistently growing significance of our
state and local governments as centers of policy making and public activ-
ity. The size of our states' collective workforce multiplied four-and-one-
third times between 1952 and 1992.182 As of 1995, that workforce was
nearly one-and-two-thirds the size of the federal workforce, which, by con-
trast, has declined steadily throughout the current decade. 183 During the
same forty-year period, direct expenditures by state and local govern-
ments, held constant for 1992 dollars, multiplied six times to over 1.1 tril-
lion dollars.' 8 4 This is 1.81 times the rate of growth in federal
expenditures. 1
85
The federal government did not impede the growth of state activity.
It fueled it. Between 1970 and 1998, federal grants-in-aid to the states
went from just over $24 million to nearly $251 million, 186 which, even
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
182. See HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERI-
CAN POLITICS, 1997-1998 303-04 (1998).
1952 1992 Rate of Growth
State employees 1,060,000 4,595,000 433 percent
Federal civilian employees 2,583,000 3,047,000 118 percent
183. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 331 tbl. 530 (118th ed. 1998) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AB-
sTRACT] (indicating 4,719,000 state employees vs. 2,895,000 federal civilian employ-
ees). The federal civilian workforce comprised 3,105,000 in 1990, but only
2,895,000 in 1995, slightly under the total of 2,898,000 persons, which the federal
government employed in 1980. See id. It should be noted that these figures differ
somewhat from those reported in STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 182, at 255, which
are based on the data of a different government agency. The cited trends and
comparisons, however, are equally observable in both sets of data.
184. See STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 182, at 313-14, 390-91.
Direct expenditures (millions of dollars)
(B) 1952,
adjusted for
inflation Rate of growth,
(A) 1952 through 1992 (C) 1992 C/B (%)
State and local 30,863 189,838 1,141,075 601
Federal 67,700 416,423 1,381,700 332
The re-calculation of 1952 expenditure levels based on 1992 values was accom-
plished through the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator offered at the
NASA web site. See NASA, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator (visited Feb. 17,
2000) <http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateCPI.html>.
185. See NASA, supra note 184 (noting that state expenditures grew faster
than federal expenditures).
186. See CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 183, at 310 tbl. 504
(listing federal grant statistics).
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measured in 1998 dollars, was still a 249% increase. 187 Against this back-
ground, any anxiety that individual freedom is threatened in the United
States by a national government intent on crippling state sovereignty
seems utterly fantastical. This point is all the stronger in light of recent
legislation, some proposed,1 8 8 some adopted, 189 that is highly protective
of state interests, as well as executive orders emanating from both Republi-
can and Democratic presidents counseling executive agencies to be more
attentive to federalism concerns. 190
The potential perversity of Commerce Clause activism on behalf of
the states is evident in New York v. United States,19 1 the very case with which
the Supreme Court launched its anti-commandeering principle. 19 2 That
case concededly posed a hard question. By mandating that states imple-
ment a federal regulatory scheme through legislative action, Congress ar-
guably was impinging upon an indisputable aspect of state sovereignty.
Proscribing such a scheme categorically, however, effectively prevents
Congress from helping address the states' collective action problems. The
1985 amendments to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 193 which
the Court partially invalidated in New York v. United States, enacted a set of
compromises arrived at and endorsed by the National Governors Associa-
tion after the states proved unable to comply with the original Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 194 which had been enacted in 1980.195 The
original act, which also embodied the legislative recommendations of the
187. See NASA, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator (visited Jan 19, 2000)
<http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateCPI.html> (stating that $24 million in 1970
was equivalent of $100.8 million in 1998).
188. See, e.g., Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S.1214, 106th Cong.
(promoting principles of federalism); State and Local Government Participation
Act of 1999, H.R. 2029, 106th Cong. (requiring that federal agencies consult with
state agencies and local governments on environmental impact statements). The
power of state governments and their advocates in congressional deliberations is
dramatically illustrated by the Federalism Accountability Act; it has made consider-
able progress in the House despite the combined opposition of business groups,
who prefer uniform, national standard-setting, and labor and environmental
groups, who fear a weakening of national enforcement efforts. See Ron Eckstein,
Federalism Bills Unify Usual Foes, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at 1 (discussing interest
group opposition to Federalism Accountability Act).
189. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp.
11 1996) (describing purpose of act).
190. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13, 132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43, 255 §6 (Aug. 4, 1999),
superseding Exec. Order No. 12,612, Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987) (orders by Presi-
dents Clinton and Reagan, respectively, requiring agencies to consult with states
and to accommodate state policy making where possible in implementation of fed-
eral programs).
191. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
192, See generally id.
193. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)).
194. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 3348 (repealed 1996).
195. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 189-94 (White, J., dissenting) (sum-
marizing history of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act).
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National Governors Association, addressed the radioactive waste disposal
problem by authorizing the states to form regional compacts to deal with
the problem of radioactive waste disposal. 19 6 Only after this technique
failed did Congress leave states with the choice of either regulating radio-
active waste consistent with congressional standards or "taking title to and
possession of the low level radioactive waste generated within their bor-
ders and becoming liable for all damages waste generators suffer as a re-
sult of the States' failure to do so promptly."19 7 Thus, from start to finish,
the animating forces behind the so-called commandeering of state author-
ity were the states themselves. Invalidating this statute frustrated, rather
than protected, the states' capacity to fashion their own favored solutions
to pressing public problems.
None of this is to deny the importance of the federalism values that
lay at the heart of the current era of judicial activism. These values-cul-
tural diversity, government accountability, state experimentation, and the
protection of individual freedom-are hardly less important now than at
our founding. Of course, the association of these values with the states
may embody some degree of romanticization. For example, it is worth
considering whether, in some respects, the federal government, although
generally more remote from "the People," might actually be easier to
monitor and approach effectively, and, to that extent, more accountable
to the average citizen than are state and local governments. 19 8
V. A CONCLUDING SPECULATION
But there is a bigger point here. Under current economic, social and
technological circumstances, Congress may chiefly be the states' necessary
partner, rather than their adversary, in protecting values of localism and
the states' capacity for experimentation. In some cases, such as waste dis-
posal or, for that matter, the regulation of child labor, the states face "pris-
196. See id. at 190-92 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing gubernatorial
recommendations).
197. Id. at 174-75.
198. Readers of this Article might compare, for example, the ease with which
any citizen can track and comment on current policy matters before the EPA or
FCC by visiting their respective homepages, with the procedures necessary to ascer-
tain comparable information about the structure, processes, and substantive agen-
das of their county governments. See, e.g., United States Environmental Protection
Agency (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www/epa/gov> (EPA homepage); Federal
Communications Commission (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www/fcc/gov> (FCC
homepage). In my own situation, the web site for Pennsylvania's Allegheny
County is unusually rich with information, but it is not searchable. See Welcome to
Allegheny County (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.county.allegheny.pa.us.index.
asp> (Allegheny County homepage). There is no obvious reference to "the envi-
ronment" or "land use" in any guide to the site. See id. The increasing consolida-
tion of mass media in both print and broadcast has also led to the domination of
national news coverage over local news, which further increases the effort entailed
for citizens trying to remain abreast of local developments in politics and policy
making.
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oner's dilemma" problems that only an external authority can
overcome. 19 9 Public policy experimentation typically requires resources
that the states cannot muster entirely for themselves. State accountability
may be weakened by the absence of federal monitoring.
At the risk of closing on the briefest mention of a very big and specu-
lative idea, I also wonder whether the greatest risk to localism at the turn
of the Millennium is not the accumulation of national governmental
power, but rather the burgeoning of private economic power that is
largely unaccountable to any polity whatever. As Parisians bristle against
what has cleverly been called "McDomination," it seems clear that the
choices among social values and living conditions made available by the
states are threatened by economic and technological trends that, if they
are worth resisting, cannot be resisted effectively without a sympathetic
national legislative authority.2 00 If we are to "renovate" or even "translate"
our founding commitments to diversity into something equally compelling
in the post-industrial age, we will have to rely on political actors more for-
midable than our judges and acts of creativity more meaningful than the
imposition of artificial doctrinal constraints on Congress' regulatory
powers.
199. See generally ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S Di-
LEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1965) (describing classic collec-
tive action problem in which individuals may profit by self-sacrifice but often
choose not to for fear that others will take advantage of their self-sacrifice).
200. See Susannah Patton, French Farmers Rail Against McDomination, THE SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at A18 (discussing French resistance to commercialism in
food market).
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